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Economic Valuation of the Environment 
 
Steve Yearley, University of Edinburgh 
 
Environment and Society: Concepts and Challenges 
 
Introduction: economists aim to help the environment by pricing it 
 
 This chapter argues for and makes initial progress in undertaking a sociology 
of practices for valuing the environment. In particular, it offers a critical examination 
of the growth of economic valuations of environmental or ecological ‘goods’ and 
makes an assessment of key practical steps in attributing economic values to the 
environment. It argues that valuation and procedures for value attribution deserve 
to be considered a key concern within environmental social science. This chapter 
highlights the fact that, despite the significant growth of sociological studies of 
environmental topics over recent decades, not enough attention has been focused 
on the consequences of the ways in which economic conceptualisations and thinking 
have colonised the environmental sphere. Accordingly, attention is here directed at 
the way in which the environment has been made the subject for economic thinking, 
at some of the institutions that have grown up around this development, and at the 
practices of valuation that link everyday actions to economic pricing.  
 
 It is uncontroversial to suggest that the idea of interpreting and expressing 
environmental problems in economic terms began to be popularised around thirty 
years ago, and economic valuations of ecological issues have played a central role in 
environmental policy debates for nearly as long. But empirical and conceptual issues 
around the work of making economic valuations applicable to environmental entities 
have received relatively little attention within environmental sociology.i  
 
 Accordingly, this chapter commences with an exploration of the fundamental 
steps in economic valuations of the environment and of the rationale for their use. It 
moves on to review some recent ideas from science and technology studies, 
economic sociology and the social studies of finance which assist in understanding 
how markets are made and how economic logics are performed. Using examples 
from the cases of greenhouse-gas pricing and the valuation of ecosystem services, 
the chapter then analyses areas where the work of valuation is particularly 
contentious; it shows how social scientific insights are helpful in understanding the 
social processes by which valuations are arrived at. The chapter concludes by 
demonstrating how a case has been made for economic valuation to be recognised 
as a core concern for contemporary environmental social science. 
 
Making the environment a subject for economic valuation 
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 The core intellectual ‘moves’ in rendering environmental problems in 
economic terms are now relatively well known, but they can usefully be quickly 
summarised. One key principle is to interpret characteristic environmental harms as 
a form of ‘negative externality’, a cost or burden imposed on the public good through 
private actions. On this view, car drivers in urban areas are despoiling the air and 
thereby they are imposing ‘costs’ on people’s health and wellbeing, affecting urban 
wildlife, and most likely damaging buildings. But the drivers are not paying the price 
for this harm since no environmental compensation costs are explicitly included in 
fuel prices or car taxation (and so on). Nor have drivers typically had to pay more to 
use their car where it causes most pollution. 
 
 To address this problem, economists proposed that environmental ‘goods’ are 
attributed with an economic value: that one thinks of clean air or fresh water as 
elements of natural capital and that one considers the good that aspects of the 
environment do for society as ‘environmental services’.ii To the objection that the 
environment is not something that should be valued in economic terms, the counter-
argument is that unless an economic value is attached to the environment it will be 
exploited and over-used. If the worth of clean urban air is expressed in financial 
terms, then the costs imposed on the city by drivers will be made apparent. Ways 
can then be found to re-allocate the price of environmental harms to drivers 
(through road-use permits for example or more sophisticated taxation schemes). This 
will lead drivers to use their cars less on urban roads and the environment will 
accordingly benefit.  
 
 A very similar logic can be applied to environmental resources: oil in the 
ground or fish in the sea and so on. Conventionally, these ‘assets’ are effectively 
priced only at the cost of extracting them. There is customarily no allowance for the 
decline in the value of the stock itself, even – in some cases – up to the point of 
exhaustion of the resource. Quite aside from the climate-change aspects of fossil 
fuels, the point is that in some obvious sense the world gets poorer as oil is used up 
(fish too if they are caught faster than they can breed), but this is not reflected in the 
price of oil-based products. In recent decades, fossil-fuel-based electricity has been 
cheaper to generate in many locations than most renewable kinds but the situation 
would in many locations have been reversed had the value of the decline in stocks 
been costed in to the price of coal or oil. 
 
 From the start, environmental economists anticipated objections to their 
approach. They were keen to point out that they were not trying to shrink the worth 
of natural riches by putting a money price on them. Instead they were saving the 
environment from the senseless over-use that was promoted precisely because 
environmental ‘goods’ were not priced in financial terms , because in an economic 
sense they were ‘free’. These arguments have recently been endorsed in a 
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sociological context by Fairbrother (2016) who advocates that sociologists should 
adopt the term externality in the economists’ sense. 
 
 In the UK, these arguments were popularised in a series of books associated 
with David Pearce (starting with Pearce et al 1989), a celebrated academic economist 
who was also adviser to the Secretary of State for the Environment under the 
Conservative government from 1989-1992. In interviews a colleague and I conducted 
in the UK finance ministry (the Treasury) in the early-mid 1990s, we found that the 
language of natural capital and even the definition of sustainable development as 
‘non-declining natural plus cultural capital’ had already become widespread among 
civil servants (Forrester and Yearley 1995).iii At that time, the UK’s leading 
environmental NGOs were hostile to or ambivalent about such approaches. But by 
2013, the former Executive Director of Friends of the Earth in London (Tony Juniper) 
had authored a popular and successful book (2013, entitled What Has Nature Ever 
Done for Us?) which aims to show (according to the cover blurb) how ‘nature 
provides the “natural services” that keep the economy going’. 
 
 These arguments now appear almost obvious and incontestable. Perhaps 
most famously, this kind of approach was applied to the issue of climate change in 
the internationally influential ‘Stern Report’. Nicholas Stern (2007) used 
environmental economics to make climate change an issue for bankers, insurers and 
investors to take seriously. His celebrated assertion, often quoted from the Royal 
Economic Society public lecture of 2007, is that: ‘The problem of climate change 
involves a fundamental failure of markets: those who damage others by emitting 
greenhouse gases generally do not pay … Climate change is a result of the greatest 
market failure the world has seen’ (emphasis added). Though the exact economic 
basis of his calculations has been subject to a lot of technical criticism and debate, 
Stern’s key argument was that thinking of climate change in financial terms allows 
one to see that the price of tackling climate change – however daunting it looks – is  
actually small and affordable compared with the costs of not acting. 
 
 Finally in this section, it is clear that this is not just a way to couch arguments 
about priorities and needs. It is not an academic or ‘paper’ exercise only. 
Environmental taxes, aimed at discouraging polluting activities, were already familiar 
in the 1980s; for example, lead-free petrol (gasoline) was taxed less than regular fuel 
to encourage motorists to adopt the less polluting alternative. For its part, the idea 
of pricing has been directly adopted in high-profile environmentally related policies. 
The first, well known and large-scale application was the approach to acid emissions 
from US power stations where permits to emit were created and traded. The total 
permitted amount across the whole sector was gradually reduced as permits were 
withdrawn year by year. Power stations that polluted less could afford to sell on their 
unneeded permits and thereby enhance their profits. By contrast, managers of the 
more polluting plant had to buy additional permits, adding to their costs and making 
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them poor performers in the commercial marketplace. The market in permits 
encouraged good environmental performance, while the poorly performing plant 
was marginalised and closed down. Environmental reforms were achieved through 
the market without the state (and constituency politicians) having to pick winners 
and losers. Moreover, this was achieved – in the economists’ view – in an 
economically efficient manner: cleaner electricity was produced precisely in those 
plants where cleaning up was most cost-efficient. Thus the overall energy-generation 
system was reformed in an environmentally benign direction at something like the 
lowest possible cost using price signals rather than explicit policy mandates (see the 
detailed coverage in Ellerman et al 2000).  
 
 Similar arguments have been applied in the carbon dioxide emissions case. 
They underlay the nearly successful US ‘cap and trade’ climate policy of the first term 
of the Obama Presidency (known as the Waxman-Markey Bill, this legislation failed in 
2010; see Skocpol 2013 and also Dunlap and Brulle 2015). These arguments also 
underpin the carbon markets that have come into existence around the world, 
though most notably in the EU. Finally, ecosystem services (such as the provision of 
clean water or pollination services) and the value of biodiversity have also 
increasingly come to be treated in this way. Policies for conservation are commonly 
expressed in terms of the value of the services supplied by habitats and species , and 
habitat conservation is frequently said to have an economic rationale. 
 
Theorising valuation and the attribution of economic values 
 
 This trend towards economic valuation – and not only in the environmental 
realm – is so pronounced that there has not surprisingly been some sociological 
attention paid to it, and both analysts coming from within economic sociology and 
from science and technology studies (known as social studies of finance) have been 
influential. Aspects of the economics literature – as well as the response by 
ecological economists (see Spash 1999) – have also been important in promoting 
critical reflection on these moves.  
 
 A useful starting point for the present review is the now well-known pair of 
papers by Çalışkan and Callon (2009; 2010) that focuses on the issue of economising 
or ‘economisation’. This is not economising in the sense of making savings, but the 
disruptive idea that economists typically approach their work on the assumption that 
a market or an economy already exists. These authors’ point is that in many areas 
things have to be turned into an economy before the ‘laws of economics’ have a 
chance of applying to them. It is this process that they refer to as economisation. 
Such work on the making of ‘economies’ is not unprecedented of course; Mulkay and 
colleagues studied the rise of the discipline and practice of health economics in 
rather similar terms in the 1980s. Thus, Mulkay et al (1987) showed how techniques 
had to be institutionalised for comparing the burden of various diseases and 
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conditions so that economic approaches could subsequently be used to compare the 
cost of therapies against their typical benefits to patients. New practices for 
registering and comparing the harms done by worn hips or by diabetes had to be 
instituted before the average costs and benefits of various treatments could be 
assessed in economic terms.  But Çalışkan and Callon helpfully build a general case 
for the dependence of economics on the social processes through which markets are 
made. 
 
 A further key contribution to this analytical programme was offered by 
MacKenzie who highlighted the performativity of economics, meaning by this the 
way in which economic ideas come into reality only as they are performed by 
economic actors. Economies are constituted by people and their actions, so that 
economic laws are performative in a way that, say, chemical laws are not. In 
particular, he emphasised what he calls ‘Barnesian performativity’ (2006, 21) where 
‘Practical use of an aspect of economics makes economic processes more like their 
depiction by economics’ (2006, 17). MacKenzie’s study is primarily about financial 
economics and the way in which theories about how to value derivatives (and other 
complex products) have come to shape actors’ and institutions’ responses to the 
developing market in just these products.iv People who believe that a theory 
prescribes the best way to act (in setting a price or in hedging investment risks) will 
tend to try to behave more and more in accordance with the theory; in some sense 
this will make the theory more descriptively accurate and more ‘true’. 
 
 For his initial studies MacKenzie chose an area where the theory was 
complicated and actors had to put a lot of work into following its precepts. But one 
can also observe that environmental economics has a performative component to it. 
People come to view aspects of the environment increasingly in economic terms and 
then begin to treat environmental entities as economic instruments. For example, 
businesses develop that deal in carbon offsetting for flights or taxi trips and so on. 
Other actors can then trade in this offset carbon. Combining MacKenzie’s idea with 
the approach of Çalışkan and Callon, one can observe that firms, or sub-divisions of 
existing firms, are set up to trade in carbon futures but this market needed to be 
constructed as an economic entity before their actions could conceivably take place. 
In these cases, there would be no scope for the economic activity without the 
institutions that the economic theory has underwritten. At the same time, the 
business of trading in carbon futures (say) reinforces the very idea of seeing climate 
change and excessive carbon emissions as something to be addressed through 
economic measures. 
 
 This focus on the development and imposition of an economic discourse onto 
environmental entities has also provoked reflection and critique by academics in 
disciplines close to economics. There is, for example, a tradition – about as old as 
‘modern’ environmental economics – which refers to itself as ecological economics 
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(Spash 1999, 425-430). The distinctive emphasis here is on using ideas from the 
ecological and other sciences to try to pinpoint what is distinctive about ecological 
systems as compared with other objects that are made available through markets. 
The aim is to marry ecology and the other natural sciences with economics in order 
to have a quantitatively precise and scientifically accurate understanding of the 
dynamics of ecological systems. The fact that an early influential text (Georgescu-
Roegen 1971) refers to thermodynamics and features the term ‘entropy’ in its title is 
indicative of the way in which ecological economists wished to emphasise the 
distinctiveness of environmental systems. 
 
 The operation of economic discourses of value has also been addressed by 
other sociologists, only loosely associated with the starting points of Callon or 
MacKenzie, who have begun to study the practical work of attributing value in 
organisational or accounting contexts. For example, Asdal (2008) has written 
evocatively of the ‘little tools’ that link economic precepts to the practical valuations 
that civil servants and other functionaries have to attach to landscapes or amenities.  
In a related vein, Fourcade (2011) has examined international comparisons between 
the ways in which, for example, oil spills are attributed with an economic impact or 
cost. She highlights the complexity of the institutional arrangements through which 
values come to be assigned in apparently economically similar countries such as 
France and the USA. Though economic values are at stake, law courts may play as big 
a role as markets in arriving at binding valuations of ecological problems. 
   
 This kind of approach to the day-to-day practices of value ascription has given 
rise to a more general interest in the sociology of valuation as exemplified by the 
founding of the e-journal Valuation Studies (in 2013, see Helgesson and Muniesa 
2013). They assert that the journal’s raison d’être is ‘that “valuation as a social 
practice” is a specific and interesting topic to study’ (2013, 3). Here the focus is on 
studying more generally the social processes involved in performing valuations; as 
Dussauge et al put it: “The proposition [is] that we examine all kinds of values as 
upshots of practices …” (2015, 8, original emphasis).  
 
Analysing valuations in the environmental arena 
 
 For the purposes of this chapter, directed at arguing for the study of 
(economic) valuation as a core concern of environmental social science, it is helpful 
to examine empirical issues around valuation in relation to two leading 
contemporary environmental issues. The first, and better known, concerns the 
attempt to put a price on climate policy options, to develop markets in carbon, to 
value carbon sinks, and to trade forgone emissions through the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI), and associated strategies. The second 
case has been less discussed in this sense, but it is at least equally  critical; it concerns 
practices of, and concepts for, the valuation of natural resources – especially in 
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relation to ecosystems-services assessments and attempts to “cash out” the value of 
biodiversity. In presenting this overview, I shall divide the analysis into four thematic 
sub-sections – the first two dealing with in-principle concerns and the latter pair with 
issues at the practical level. 
 
Questioning the appropriateness of economic valuations 
 
 The first set of key questions is to do with the suitability of economising or 
implementing a market in environmental goods per se. The doubt is whether a 
market works in expressing the kinds of value that actors believe should be ascribed 
to the environment (at a philosophical level this has been a key concern publicised by 
Sandel, see his 2012). O’Neill had already made this point very starkly two decades 
ago (1993, 64) when he argued (against cost-benefit-type approaches to valuing 
environmental goods) that ‘The defence of environmental goods requires reference 
not to preferences as they are, but to preferences as they ought to be’. His concern 
was that neo-classical economics turns on contingent preferences – people’s 
measured preferences as they happen to be. These are taken as empirical inputs, as 
a statement of how things are, and then the argument is made that – given what we 
know about people’s preferences – more should be done to protect the 
environment. But O’Neill is concerned about potential conflicts between preferences 
and what is good for the natural environment, and he is also worried about the 
changeability (one might say ‘unreliability’) and malleability of preferences. This 
anxiety is shared by many ecological economists who hope to identify scientific 
reasons why valuations of key environmental goods should be set on a different basis 
from most other, customary goods.  
 
 Responding to the Stern Review on the cost of climate change, columnist and 
campaigner George Monbiot made a similar point in the New Left Review in 2007: 
This methodology leads to a disastrous consequence, unintended but surely 
obvious. Stern’s report shows that the dollar losses from failing to prevent a 
high degree of global warming outweigh the dollar savings arising from not 
taking action. It therefore makes economic sense to try to prevent runaway 
climate change. But what if the result had been different? What if he had 
discovered that the profits accruing from burning more fossil fuels exceeded 
the social cost of carbon? (2007, 106). 
In effect, Monbiot observes that it is ‘lucky’ that the figures in the Stern Review 
worked out in favour of environmental interventions. It is logically possible that they 
might not have, and that it would be instrumentally rational to put up with extensive 
climate changes if – for example – the costs of action significantly exceeded the 
calculated price of adapting to or fixing the likely impacts. 
 
 Overall, the anxiety here is that, once the decision is made to express the 
gravity of environmental problems in economic terms, there is nowhere else to turn 
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if the financial calculation runs against you. If one accepts (however tentatively and 
unwillingly) that the value of ecosystems services should be expressed in monetary 
terms, then one is accepting that other monetary values can (potentially) exceed the 
value of ecosystems. Bees, for example, currently seem very valuable, and the value 
of the pollination services they provide has been used as a powerful resource in 
arguing for taking a precautionary line in recent policy debates over what to do 
about the possible toxic effects of neonicotinoid insecticides (see Juniper 2013, 105). 
However, if in a thought experiment it turned out that smart, robotic drones were 
able to do the job more effectively, then bees might lose the benefit of the 
pollination services they formerly supplied. If bees are valued primarily for the 
services they supply, when those services are no longer needed bees will see their 
value wiped out. 
 
 This conceptual or philosophical point is aggravated by the observation that 
prices are not as precise and robust as economic theory seems to presuppose. In the 
case of the Stern Review (as Jamieson 2014 carefully demonstrates) the argument 
over the review’s conclusions moved from one about carbon/climate policies to one 
about the correct discount rate (the extent to which a sum now is preferred over the 
‘same’ sum in the future). Change a few assumptions and the manner in which future 
harms are costed in today’s money, and it can be made to appear overwhelmingly 
rational to act right away or, on the other hand, to do nearly nothing now and wait 
for solutions (cheaper, better batteries for example) to come along. Jamieson 
concludes that economics alone can resolve little about the right way to price carbon 
emissions because the answer will depend on how one values future wellbeing, and 
this is an ethical or political issue. If the critical and decisive part of the equation 
depends on – potentially irresolvable – questions about the correct discount rate, 
then one cannot easily delegate responsibility for environmental protection onto the 
market (Yearley 2009). Moreover, as occurred with the Stern Review, a lot of 
attention passes to clashes over the details of the calculation and away from the 
specifics of what climate policies to adopt or the societal consequences of 
environmental change.  
 
How general is the applicability of economic valuations?  
 
 A related issue concerns the extent to which pricing, even if it is suitable for 
some environmental entities, is applicable to all classes of problems. Early debates 
here centred on environmental ‘goods’ for which there was neither a market nor an 
identifiable ‘service’. Many of the knottiest examples came from the field of 
conservation and had to do with envisaging the value of endangered species or 
threatened habitats. 
 
 Some environmental attributes of this sort could indeed be thought of in 
economic terms and priced using familiar methodologies. For example, if tourists pay 
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(or invest resources) to visit a place known for scenic or dramatic views then one 
perhaps has a way of thinking about the value of the landscape to those people; its 
value is expressed through the amount of money and lost earnings they are willing to 
commit to visiting it. Similarly, if people now visit the Azores or New Zealand to 
engage in whale-watching then one can think about the visitor-value of the wildlife. 
Accordingly, conservation investments (in preserving habitat and so on) can be 
shown to be economically rational (or not) and one could even think of ‘ecology 
investment’ agencies comparing different wildlife sites and working out where best 
to get a conservation return for every dollar committed. 
 
 There remains, however, the unobserved or perhaps unattractive wildlife, and 
here the solution seemed to be to talk about ‘existence value’. In other words, 
certain aspects of the environment were to be prized simply for their existence. The 
economic value of this could only be assessed by carrying out surveys or other price-
estimating exercises. Researchers would have to attempt to gauge what people 
would notionally pay to ensure that species continued to exist or would notionally 
demand to be compensated for the species going extinct. Jacobs early on (1994) 
pointed out the drawbacks of such approaches, given apparent inconsistencies in the 
answers received and also the artificiality of the monetary values when people are 
asked about the price of something they have no experience of trading in, and in a 
market with only a make-believe existence. 
 
 Additionally, there have been related difficulties with attempts to be precise 
about the valuation of all aspects of ecosystem services. A formulation in terms of 
‘ecosystem services’ came to be preferred to talking of environmental services 
because it appeared to offer a more specific account of the value delivered (see 
Mooney and Ehrlich 1997, 11-16). For instance, in the UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment (2011) services are divided into categories such as ‘regulating’ (for 
example regulating rainfall and water run-off) and ‘supporting’ (the above-
mentioned case of the pollination efforts of insects, including bees). The aim here is 
clear: to be accurate about the kinds of service ‘provided’ so that a comprehensive, 
quantitative assessment of those services can be calculated and used in policy 
decisions. These are essentially accounting measures, designed to separate out the 
kinds of value delivered to us by natural processes. However, as in other areas of 
accountancy, there are difficulties about the allocation of services to particular 
headings and about the amount of interpretative flexibility that exists in the practical 
business of making classifications (for social studies of accountancy, see Quattrone 
2012). To arrive at the ‘real’ value of ecosystem services, one requires a definitive list 
of the sub-types of services and confidence that items have not been double-
counted or accidentally omitted. But given the breadth of interpretative flexibility in 
identifying these categories and assigning bits of the natural world to them, it is not 
clear that this ‘real’ valuation can be pinned down in practice. 
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 The continuing salience of this type of problem in obtaining economic values 
of general utility is helpfully indicated by the way that aspects of the social and 
cultural value of biodiversity have recently been treated in the UK National 
Ecosystem Assessment. 
 
 The UK NEA was an exercise established in 2007 in response to the House of 
Commons Environmental Audit’s recommendation that the UK Government ought to 
conduct a Millennium Ecosystem Assessment-type evaluation for the UK to ‘enable 
the identification and development of effective policy responses to ecosystem 
service degradation’ (as expressed on the NEA websitev). In their Synthesis of the Key 
Findings (2011) the UK NEA attempted, among many other items, to address the 
religious and spiritual significance of UK ecosystems: this was one of the sub-types of 
service the natural environment was said to furnish. Their summary asserted that: 
Environmental settings play a positive role in religious practice and faith but 
more general evidence on their spiritual and religious role is limited.vi 
Religious and spiritual goods are clearly linked to our existence need for being, 
but the extent to which religious encounters with specific environmental 
settings are synergistic satisfiers for value needs such as participation and 
identity resides in the character and qualities of belief. The importance of 
ecosystems in religious terms had almost certainly increased in the post-war 
period in Britain, notwithstanding secularisation and the decline of 
conventional religious observance. There has, apparently, been an increase in 
the incidence of both pilgrimage and of religious retreats although it is 
extremely difficult to identify any quantitative measures of this trend. It is 
extremely hard to pin-point evidence of particular landscapes or ecosystems 
being conducive to religious experiences (2011, 82-83: italics added, 
underlining original). 
The underlying point that is being made about associations between experiences of 
nature and some religious sentiments is clearly a reasonable one, and the reported 
difficulty in finding quantitative measures is understandable. 
 
 However, the commitment to an ecosystem services approach leads the NEA 
authors to offer a curious way of expressing their fundamental point;  as cited above, 
they ask: are ‘religious encounters with specific environmental settings … synergistic 
satisfiers for value needs’? This approach seems to be committed from the outset to 
reducing religious sentiments to other ‘value needs’, contrary to what actors 
themselves seems to feel about the character of religious encounters. Indeed, the 
subsequent reference (in the passage cited) to ‘the character and qualities of belief’ 
rather tends to concede the same point since it implicitly allows that the character of 
the beliefs itself has some explanatory force. 
 
 These difficulties in handling religious valuations indicate persistent, profound 
problems with the generalisability of the framework that requires all values to be 
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expressed in price or quasi-economic terms. On this view, everything that has a value 
at all must have a value that can be converted into an economic value. This leads 
analysts either to mis-characterise religious (and other cultural) values by reducing 
them to economic ones or not to regard them as values in the first place.  
 
How are markets made? 
 
 While the first two points are about doubts and contests over the suitability of 
the entire exercise – the viability of the economistic ‘paradigm’ so to speak – there 
are additional problems that seem marginal but are in practice very consequential. 
These problems arise largely within the paradigm and have accordingly been 
highlighted by authors from within environmental and ecological economics as well 
as from outside. 
 
 One key, indicative issue is to do with the way in which markets are 
established. Perhaps the best known example here relates to the EU’s Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS). The ETS was intended to bring about a reduction in 
greenhouse-gas releases from the EU by creating a European market in carbon 
emissions (chiefly to the atmosphere). Actors and institutions would only be able to 
make emissions for which they had allowances. Enterprises that managed to reduce 
their emissions would be able to sell surplus permits, leading the market to favour 
relatively low-carbon operations and steering the European economy in the correct 
direction. However, despite elaborate planning and a very large investment in 
building the apparatus for a market, the market failed in the sense that the price of 
carbon dwindled and stayed low so that it made little impact on firms’ decisions and 
yielded little financial reward in terms of permit-sales for those adopting lower-
carbon techniques. 
 
 The ETS was confronted with at least two sorts of problems. First, in the 
negotiations and haggling through which allowances were determined in the first 
place, too many permits were issued and firms’ projections for the rate at which 
carbon allowances could reasonably be withdrawn from the system were too limited. 
Consequently, once the market was in operation few players had trouble acquiring 
sufficient allowances or adopting relatively cheap measures to stay within their 
allowances, and the market became otiose (Grubb 2013, 240-44). Moreover, the 
severe economic downturn from 2007/2008 meant that carbon emissions declined 
because industrial and commercial activity decreased. The carbon market could add 
little to this pressure and, in any case, governments were not keen to stifle any signs 
of economic growth that they could detect. There was an associated fear that carbon 
pricing might well lead to carbon-intensive industries moving their activities out of 
the ETS zone altogether, thus saving on permits while limiting Europe’s economic 
well-being, but without reducing overall, global emissions since the carbon would be 
released in states that imposed no charges for carbon emissions.  
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 Markets may also face design difficulties that lead to unintended incentives 
arising from the details of pricing mechanisms. Firms and countries have been willing 
to exploit such ‘loopholes’, leading to improper profits and the subversion of 
environmental objectives. Perhaps the best known case here involves a 
hydrofluorocarbon known as HFC-23vii. Since they contain no chlorine, HFCs do not 
damage the ozone layer but they can serve some of the uses formerly met by CFCs in 
refrigeration and fire-control. However, they turn out to be very potent greenhouse-
gases; HFC-23 is well over ten thousand times as warming as carbon dioxide by 
weight. Under the Kyoto Protocol, signatory countries could earn credits through the 
Clean Development Mechanism for preventing greenhouse-gas emissions elsewhere 
in the world. In other words, rather than reducing greenhouse gases at home, 
countries could meet some of their targets by paying for the reduction of emissions 
in other countries (typically in developing economies). In 2007 a controversy arose 
when Nature, New Scientist and others reported that the CDM was being employed 
to pay for the destruction of HFC-23 where it was generated as a by-product from 
making other refrigerants in China, India and elsewhere. On the face of it, this 
seemed like a good idea. But the report suggested that something odd was going on 
since ‘“HFC 23 emitters can earn almost twice as much from the CDM credits as they 
can from selling refrigerant gases – by any measure a major distortion of the 
market,” [wrote] Michael Wara of Stanford University, US, in the journal Nature’ 
(New Scientist 9th February 2007)viii. 
 
 The central irony was this. It costs relatively little to destroy HFC-23 molecules 
in a way agreed as safe, but this hydrofluorocarbon is such a powerful greenhouse 
gas that the credits for disposing of it are very high. Thus there is a potential 
economic incentive to generate the gas as a (supposed) ‘by-product’ simply to attract 
the credits. Businesses would effectively get paid to make it and then destroy it. Not 
only is this a foolish use of money, the purchase of these credits reduces the 
pressure to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the North since the Northern country 
is already credited with having eliminated greenhouse gases (the HFC-23) – even if 
the production of that HFC-23 was only motivated by the existence of the CDM 
system (on other tensions to which economic transactions around these traded gases 
give rise, see Bailey et al 2001). 
 
 The publicity around this problem provoked changes to the detail of the 
credits available for HFC-23 destruction. But the problem of perverse incentives to 
produce gases that generate profits from their destruction rather than their use has 
persisted – as recently recorded by researchers from the Stockholm Environment 
Institute (Schneider and Kollmuss 2015) citing, among others, cases in Russia and 
Ukraine.ix More significantly still, this problem is not restricted to carbon markets; in 
free-market economies commercial actors will be motivated to follow the profits 
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offered within any system of incentives and will look for opportunities to ‘game’ the 
market – often resulting in the subversion of the supposed goals of the system. 
 
The work behind pricing and selling 
 
 The final point to which to draw attention relates to the sociology of the 
practices that result in the assignment of prices, the determination of taxation levels, 
or in decisions to trade. In ideal – or idealised – markets, prices arise from the 
interactions of buyers and sellers. In this model, market participants are well 
informed, and operate with a shared rationale for conducting trading. But some key 
environmental markets are far from ideal in this sense. 
 
 Actors who are supposed to respond to price signals to steer their 
environmentally related behaviours may not be experienced or confident in their 
market responses. For example, it has been suggested that ‘pilot’ carbon markets in 
China were less successful than hoped partly because plant managers lacked 
enthusiasm for trading. It was also in part due to the fact that they were keen to 
work out what political leaders would like them to do (and then do it) rather than 
respond to market signals (see Lo 2016, 119). Managers were used to a system of 
political direction and found it hard to adapt, or to believe that political direction had 
really been suspended in favour of a market. In this case, organisational sociology 
and political science are as central as economics to understanding the phenomenon 
of behaviour in the market. 
 
 Similarly, the analysis by Asdal (2008) already mentioned above illustrates a 
related point. In her work on the ‘Little Tools’ that enable markets to function in 
particular organisational contexts, she highlights the administrative practices that 
allow prices to be attached to specific habitats or to emissions from particular 
power-plants. Typically, for example, examples of habitats need to be categorised 
into types and then ranked – by scientific civil servants or by consultants – before 
economic values can be attached to them and market disciplines applied. Again, and 
as illustrated by the case of the contested categorisation of peatbogs and their 
conservation value (Yearley 1989), the values ascribed in a market depend on these 
preceding tools and the order those tools create. Economic valuations are dependent 
upon other, earlier forms of evaluation. 
 
 Finally in this section, it should be noted that there is already a strong sense in 
which mainstream economics itself has moved away from dealing with ideal 
situations and has concentrated on psychological and even biological dimensions of 
economic behaviour. Through comparatively recent fields such as behavioural 
economics (Heukelom 2014) one could say that mainstream economics has become 
more inductively empirical. But in environmental policy initiatives such as the 
National Ecosystem Assessment case discussed above, where values are being 
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ascribed to cultural and spiritual benefits not by the actors themselves but by others 
on their behalf, it is plain that the values arrived at do not have the same kind of 
empirical warrant. The value-attributions do not arise from market interactions but 
from different kinds of professional practices altogether. These practices – from 
surveys through to professional judgements – are clearly a focus for sociological as 
well as economic investigation. This applies both because higher-level economic 
calculations may be based on inputs whose origin or original meaning is not really 
understood by the ultimate analyses, and because there is the possibility that actors 
are ‘gaming’ the valuations by attributing values that they hope will influence policy 
outcomes rather than by trying to assign the most indicative value they can. 
 
 
Valuation as a key concern for environmental sociology 
 
 Given the spread and wide adoption of economists’ versions of environmental 
value – within governments, firms and NGOs, within international organisations and 
funding agencies, and within professional training and graduate courses – it is 
apparent that economic valuation of the environment is now a key component of the 
landscape of environmental discourse and practice. This chapter has been designed 
to make a case for economic valuation being recognised as a core concern for the 
environmental social sciences. At a certain level, sociological studies of the 
environment have always acknowledged an economic dimension, notably when 
considering whether economic growth is inimical to environmental protection. But 
the focus of this chapter has been different: it has centred on the way in which 
economists have sought to assist the environmental cause by showing that 
environmental goods have economic value. As with Lord Stern’s approach to climate 
change, the argument is that environmental economics can show that environmental 
protection, even major environmental reforms, are economically beneficial.  
 
 The analysis offered in this chapter has indicated how the idea of 
‘economisation’ is central to understanding the ways in which economic discourse 
has been put forward as the authoritative and universal way of expressing the value 
of environmental goods and benefits. The paper has also highlighted the role of 
Barnesian performativity, in the sense that environmental actors have participated in 
rendering the environment a fit subject matter for the application of economic 
discourse. To think, for instance, of biodiversity and the benefits provided by the 
natural environment as ‘ecosystems services’ at all – as services to our way of life – is 
already to have economised them. 
 
 The paper has also sought to highlight specific empirical areas where the work 
of valuation is particularly contentious, and where social scientific insights are helpful 
in understanding the social processes by which valuations are arrived at. These 
insights matter both conceptually and practically, as has been shown by cases of 
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disputes about the applicability of pricing approaches, and by reports of gaming and 
malpractice within newly created markets in environmental goods. They also matter 
to a wide variety of actors, not just to government agencies and the regulators that 
handle the prices and markets, but to NGOs that worry about embracing 
environmental economics and to new firms and consultancies which aim to trade in 
carbon futures or carbon off-setting. 
 
 Finally, it is clear that other ways of valuing the environment strongly persist, 
whether that is in aesthetic or natural-history terms, in novel forms of citizen 
engagement with environmental options, or in forms of love and reverence for the 
environment that are hard to express in academic prose. The points made above 
about the importance of analysing practices for establishing the value of the 
environment apply in these cases too. There is, most likely, a very broad sociology of 
ways of valuing the environment – whether economically, aesthetically, scientifically 
or in other ways. But this chapter must content itself with a narrower aim – that of 
establishing economic valuations of the environment in all their various forms as a 
key focus for conceptual and empirical work in environmental social science. 
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i There are several exceptions here, most of which will  be returned to below but see Jacobs 1994 and O'Neill  
1993 for early critical perspectives and Sandel 2012 for a very well known, though philosophical rather than 
empirical, assessment; there is also a growing sociological l iterature on practices of valuation, ranking and 
assessment (for example, around indexes and on-line voting and approval systems) which intersects with the 
points discussed below. 
ii In the last decade it has become more common to speak of the services provided as ‘ecosystem services’ (see 
Silvertown 2015); the intended implications of using this terminology will  be examined later in this chapter. 
For now, environmental services and ecosystem services can be treated as more or less synonymous. 
iii These interviews were conducted as part of the EU-funded project “Environmental Sustainability and 
Institutional Innovation in Europe” which ran from 1 April  1994 to 31 July 1996; the UK project team was 
comprised of Steven Yearley and John Forrester. It is perhaps worth pointing out here that the Secretary of 
State is the normal title for the leading minister within a UK government ministry. 
iv In this context, the term ‘financialisation’ from economic sociology deserves a mention since it draws 
attention to the ways in which the dominance of mobile, global financial markets has influenced economic 
trends and the autonomy of political institutions; for an example, see van der Zwan 2014. 
v Consulted on 29 June 2017 http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org/About/tabid/56/Default.aspx . 
vi This headline assertion is scored with a ‘4’ in the report indica ting that the claim is ‘Speculative’ 
characterised by ‘low agreement based on limited evidence’ (2011, 67). 
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vii the naming of CFCs and hydrofluorocarbons is complicated but HFC-23 is a simple molecule; essentially a 
methane molecule with three of the hydrogen atoms replaced by fluorine: CHF3. 
viii see https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11155-kyoto-protocol-loophole-has-cost-6-billion/ consulted 
on 29 June 2017. 
ix see http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/24/kyoto-protocols-carbon-credit-scheme-
increased-emissions-by-600m-tonnes consulted on 29 June 2017.  
